The Resources and Governance of Non-Governmental Organizations in Uganda by Abigail Barr et al.
The Resources and Governance of Non-Governmental
Organizations in Uganda ∗
Abigail Barr
University of Oxford ￿
Marcel Fafchamps





Using original survey data, we document the activities, resources, and governance struc-
ture of NGOs operating in Uganda. The NGO sector is funded primarily by international
non-governmental organizations and bilateral donors. We ￿nd large diﬀerences in size and
funding across NGOs, with only a few NGOs attracting most of the funding. Most NGOs
are small and underfunded and focus on raising awareness and advocacy. Few NGOs are
faith-based. Most screening and monitoring is done by grant agencies. Some monitoring is
also done internally by members and trustees. Few respondents were able to provide coherent
￿nancial accounts. Reporting requirements appear onerous given the limited organizational
capacity of Ugandan NGOs.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
The last decade has been marked by an increased involvement of non-governmental organizations
(NGOs) in the development process. This in part re￿ects frustration and impatience with what
is perceived to be the failure of governmental development assistance either to generate growth
or to reach the poor. The success of non-governmental initiatives, such as Grameen Bank in
Bangladesh, has been put forth in development circles as illustration of NGO potential. An
increased role for NGOs has also been made possible by traditional donors￿ own frustration with
governments of poor countries and their renewed interest in democratization and ￿civil society￿
￿ hence their willingness to experiment with funding domestic NGOs in recipient countries.
Religious activism ￿ especially among evangelical churches and Muslim communities ￿ may also
have contributed to the rise of the NGO sector.
Outside of economics, there is a voluminous literature devoted to NGOs and their role in
development (e.g. Edwards & Hulme 1995, Riddel, De Coninck, Muir, Robinson & White 1995,
Farringhton, Bebbington, Wellard & Lewis 1993). But economists have devoted surprisingly
little attention to NGOs. The purpose of this paper is to ￿ll this gap by documenting the
current state of the NGO sector in Uganda. No other survey has attempted to document the
whole sector in one country in this manner. Using original survey data collected by the authors,
we clarify what Ugandan NGOs do and how, and we examine how NGOs ￿nance themselves and
how they are being monitored. To our knowledge, this is the ￿rst economic analysis of NGOs
based on a large representative survey in Africa.
We ￿nd that the Uganda NGO sector combines elements of political activism and philan-
thropic work. In terms of numbers, the sector is dominated by small organizations headed by
highly educated Ugandans. A small number of NGOs receive the lion￿s share of funding. The
sector appears as a relay for international governmental and non-governmental funding agencies.
1Little funding comes from domestic private sources, with the exception of members￿ fees. Since
members nearly always are also bene￿ciaries of the NGO, members￿ fees are probably better
understood as users￿ fees rather than fund-raising.
The dominant problem of the sector appears to be the diﬃculty for grant agencies of identi-
fying reliable local NGOs that can eﬀectively deliver what they expect of them. This diﬃculty
is re￿ected in extensive screening and monitoring practices, both by grant agencies and by gov-
ernment. The relationship between NGOs and government is complex (Farringhton et al. 1993).
At times, NGOs enter into partnership with government agencies who probably play a vetting
role, thereby facilitating NGO access to international funding. At other times, the relationship
appears more con￿ictual, with government staﬀ feeling some resentment towards NGOs when
the latter are better funded and better paid.
The heterogeneity of the NGO sector has made it a diﬃcult topic to research. This is re￿ected
in the existing literature which, although large, tends to focus on small, speci￿c case studies, more
often than not restricted to a particular agency working in a particular sector. This literature,
written primarily by non-economists, tends to focus on NGO performance and accountability
through examples and case studies (e.g. Edwards & Hulme 1995, Riddel et al. 1995, Farringhton
et al. 1993).
For instance, Farringhton et al. (1993) consider 60 case studies of farmer participatory ap-
proaches to agricultural innovation to assess the eﬀectiveness of NGOs in promoting technical
innovation and strengthening local organizations. Edwards & Hulme (1995) tackle the same
issue but attempt a more general overview by basing their conclusions on a number of small
but diverse case studies. Salamon & Anheier (1996) attempt one of the most comprehensive
overviews of the sector. They consider the scope, structure and ￿nancial base of the nonpro￿t
sector in a cross-section of countries (six developed and ￿ve developing countries) using a coher-
2ent comparative methodology. They conclude that, for developing countries, the NGO sector is
more complex and diverse, and least understood.
Aggregating individual case studies can be useful for developing conceptual insights into the
operations of NGOs and the environments in which they work. Cannon (2000) reviews health
programmes funded by Oxfam in eight districts in Uganda and highlights the tension that can
exist between NGOs and government. In a study of four projects in India and Bangladesh
for Save the Children, Edwards (1996) ￿nds that the success of an NGO is correlated with
having a clear and shared vision of what the NGO wants to achieve, and having strong linkages
between grassroot organizations and government. Belshaw & Coyle (2001) examine fourteen
NGOs involved in poverty reducing projects. They ￿nd that coverage by the NGOs tended to
be slight, slow to expand, but is often replicated by other agencies. Each of the many case studies
available is useful for exploring particular aspects of an NGO and for gaining important insights.
But generalization is made diﬃcult by the diversity of the sector and of the methodologies used
to gather empirical evidence. It is also unclear how representative are the experiences described
by the researchers.
Economists have devoted surprisingly little attention to NGOs. A literature does however
exist on the economics of nonpro￿t institutions. Powell (1987) provides a research handbook
on the topic which outlines amongst other things the history of the sector and the economic
and political theories to explain its existence. With the use of four economic models, Rose-
Ackerman (1986) proposes four possible explanations for the existence of a non-pro￿t sector:
as a response to government failure; as a response to information asymmetries and transaction
costs in the for-pro￿t sector; as driven by entrepreneurs who view the non-pro￿t ￿rm as a way
to further their own goals; and as an outcome of competitive interactions between nonpro￿t
￿rms producing close substitutes. Kaun (2001) argues that nonpro￿t organizations do not exist
3either for altruistic reasons or for overcoming informational asymmetries. Instead, they arise
when consumers, supported by institutions, integrate into production and organize to produce
a non-rival good for their own consumption. Weisbrod (1998) has written extensively on the
nonpro￿t sector but recently considered the growing commercialization of the nonpro￿ts e c t o ri n
the US. To this eﬀect, the author compares an altruistic model, which sees the commercialization
as a reluctant response to falling donations, to a model in which self-interest is a response to
changing institutional and legal constraints.
Writings by economists on NGOs proper fall under two main themes: NGOs as service
providers (e.g. Leonard 2002, Bennett, Iossa & Legrenzi 2003, Jagannathan 2003, Lindelow,
Reinikka & Swensson 2003, Reinikka & Svensson 2003); and NGOs as political institutions to
mobilize the population and lobby government or international organizations (e.g. Besley &
Ghatak 1999, Scott & Hopkins 1999, Cannon 2000, Johnson & Johnson 1990, Kennedy 1999).
With the exception of Azam & Laﬀont (2003), Platteau & Gaspart (2003a) and Ebrahim (2003)
who identify the diﬀerent actors to which NGOs are accountable and the ways in which they are
accountable, little attention has been devoted to internal governance issues. Moreover, much
of the existing empirical work on NGOs focuses on Asia and Latin America, where the micro-
￿nance experiences of BRAC and Grameen Bank in Bangladesh and FINCA in Latin America
have attracted a lot of interest. In contrast, little is known about the NGO sector in Africa
apart from a few case studies such as those mentioned earlier.
We begin by discussing some of the conceptual issues surrounding the NGO sector in general.
We then present the data collection methodology. The characteristics of the sample are discussed
next. NGO activities and resources are then presented in detail. Governance issues are examined
next, with a special focus on monitoring and oversight.
42 Conceptual framework
To understand the governance and incentive issues surrounding NGOs, we need a conceptual
framework. Like corporations, NGOs are organizations put together for a purpose. But their
objectives are quite diﬀerent. From a purely legal perspective, NGOs are not a single legal
concept but several. Two main characteristics distinguish NGOs from other organizations: they
are not motivated by the search for pro￿t; and they have a charitable purpose. The second
characteristic is what enables them to legally solicit funds from the public.
Non-pro￿t organizations are those that do not seek to generate a pro￿tf o rt h e i ro w n e r s
(Glaeser 2003). If a pro￿t is generated ￿ in the sense of an excess of revenues over costs ￿ it is
ploughed back into the organization. Non-pro￿t status typically entitles an organization to be
exempted from corporate taxation. Non-pro￿t organizations need not have a charitable purpose.
In fact, many only seek to serve the interests of their members. In developed countries, non-pro￿t
status is important because corporate pro￿t tax rates are high. In contrast, non-pro￿t status is
less important in developing countries, at least for small ￿rms and organizations, because the
state seldom seeks to collect corporate tax on all ￿rms and organizations.
In law, charities are diﬀerent from other non-pro￿t organizations in that they seek to serve
the public good. To perform this function, they solicit funds from various benefactors: their
members, the public at large, the government, and other charities. Benefactors give to phil-
anthropic organizations because they care about public good. They typically choose to fund
those organizations that promise to spend the funds on the socially valuable goal they most care
about. It is in benefactors￿ interest to sponsor charities that are more eﬃcient than others at
pursuing this goal.
Developed countries all have instituted sophisticated legislation regulating charities. This
is because unscrupulous individuals may solicit funds from the public but keep the money for
5themselves. This kind of behavior undermines the public￿s trust in charities and reduces funding.
It is therefore in the interest of bona ￿de charities to regulate the industry so as to weed out
crooks and ensure the con￿dence of the public. This has led many developed countries to
institute various reporting requirements. In the UK, for instance, this task is handled by the
Charities Commission.1
Perks and excess wages and allowances are an easy way for crooks to divert charitable funds
into their pocket (e.g. Ebrahim 2003, Edwards & Hulme 1995). However, there is nothing illegal
or inherently unethical for charities to pay their staﬀ and management going wages. Big charities
are large organizations that require talented managers and competent professional staﬀ.T h e
staﬀ they recruit need not be motivated by a desire to contribute to the philanthropic objective
of the NGO and may thus be unwilling to volunteer their time for sub-market pay. Since it is
diﬃcult to identify what the correct ￿market￿ pay of a worker or manager is, it is also diﬃcult
to ascertain whether a philanthropic organization is operating in a fraudulent manner or not.
In practice, the situation of charities varies in developed and developing countries. In de-
veloped countries, philanthropic organizations operate primarily to attract funds from the gov-
ernment and from the public and to channel these funds to a charitable purpose, often in a
poor country. As we will see in the case of Uganda, collecting funds from the public is less
important in poor countries because the bulk of NGO funding comes from international sources
￿ non-governmental and governmental funding agencies (e.g. Stiles 2002, Lister 2001).
In a context where most funding comes from international benefactors, new incentive prob-
lems emerge. Talented Ugandans ￿ what Platteau & Gaspart (2003a)c a l l￿ d e v e l o p m e n tb r o k e r s ￿
￿ may initiate a local NGO not so much because they care about public good but because they
hope to secure a grant to pay themselves a wage. Although some may ￿nd this approach mer-
1How eﬀective the Commission is at scrutinizing charities remains unclear, however, given its limited means
and personnel.
6cenary or uncharitable, there is nothing inherently illegal in this approach provided the local
NGO eﬀectively and eﬃciently provides the social services for which it secured the money. Lo-
cal NGOs that operate in this manner are in fact operating as subcontractors for international
NGOs and donors. They are de facto ￿for-pro￿t￿ philanthropic organizations. The non-pro￿t
dimension of local NGOs becomes secondary: excess revenues over costs can easily be absorbed
in high salaries, per diems, or perks. An NGO may thus not generate any accounting pro￿t but
still de facto operate as a business serving the interests of its promoters. In such a system, the
presence or absence of abuse ultimately depends on how eﬀectively the money is spent to serve
public good.
It is in the public interest that funding get channelled to the organizations best able to
achieve their stated objectives, irrespective of what these objectives are. This means funding
the best performing organizations. Given the nature of the work performed by NGOs, assessing
their performance is notoriously diﬃcult. First, NGOs do not normally charge bene￿ciaries for
the full cost of what they provide. Consequently, the demand for their services cannot be used as
indicator of the value of services provided. Put diﬀerently, we cannot tell whether bene￿ciaries
value the service received from an NGO more than what it costs to produce.2 This means
that the value of the service must be assessed from bene￿ciaries themselves, though surveys
or participatory assessment methods. Second, NGOs have an incentive to overestimate the
value bene￿ciaries place on their services, if only to increase the likelihood of future funding.3
Consequently, NGOs must be monitored by grant agencies to ensure that what they report
is accurate. A compounding factor that makes monitoring particularly diﬃcult and costly is
2Of course, there may be very good reasons why one would want to subsidize services, such as the presence of
externalities (e.g., vaccination campaigns) or the desire to help the poor. If there were no externalities, one could
argue that a better delivery system would be to give the money to the poor and let them purchase the service
from a for-pro￿t provider. This would signi￿cantly reduce monitoring costs and the risk of capture. But this is
another debate.
3The incentive to over-represent is present even if the NGO￿s motivation is purely charitable, as long as it
believes it can do more and better in the future.
7the very nature of NGO work ￿ immaterial services, such as raising awareness, lobbying, and
advocacy; serving the poor over a wide geographical area; many small interventions.
In the for-pro￿t sector, when ￿rms under-perform (or embezzle their own funds), this puts
a downward pressure on pro￿ts. With suﬃcient competition, under-performing ￿rms eventually
go out of business, leaving only eﬃcient ￿rms. In the NGO sector, however, there is no market
force to penalize under-performing organizations except competition for grants. The aggregate
eﬃciency of the NGO sector therefore depends on the behavior of grant agencies. In principle,
we expect grant providers to closely monitor the performance of local NGOs both in terms of
accountability and of eﬃciency. Presumably, the outcome of this monitoring process is that
under-performing NGOs get blacklisted and performing NGOs are rewarded with more funding.
Only if grant agencies cut funding to under-performing NGOs and reallocate it to more eﬃcient
ones can we reasonably expect the sector to be eﬃcient.
As performance is diﬃcult to assess, grant agencies may ￿nd it diﬃcult to identify under-
performing organizations. Consequently, some ineﬃcient NGOs may be able to survive longer
than they should. In such a context, grant agencies are likely to enter in long-term relationships
with satisfactory grant recipients in order to economize on screening costs. We would therefore
expect new NGOs to have diﬃculties establishing themselves, for reasons similar to those noted
for other markets (Fafchamps 2002).
Armed with these concepts, we are now in a position to examine the evidence. We begin
with a discussion of the data collection methodology.
3 Data collection and sample design
In Uganda, the growth of the NGOs sector goes back to the 1970￿s and 1980￿s, when many
NGOs came in to ￿l lt h eg a pl e f tb yt h ec o l l a p s eo fg o v e r n m e n t .T h em o v e m e n tw a s￿rst ini-
8tiated by faith-based organizations, principally large established churches. This movement was
subsequently reinforced by international NGOs, before being relayed by governmental donors
and, more recently, by the Ugandan government itself. Today, the Ugandan NGO sector gener-
ates mixed feelings among policy makers: while many recognize the useful role the sector plays,
there is rampant suspicion that not all NGOs genuinely take public interest to heart.4
The idea of a study of the NGO sector in Uganda was ￿rst proposed by a group of NGOs
during the preparation of the ￿rst Poverty Reduction Support Credit (PRSC). NGOs expressed
ad e s i r et o￿nd out the major roles played by NGOs in Uganda, their strengths and weaknesses,
their working relationship with government, and the factors that aﬀect this relationship.5 In
response, a study project was initiated in collaboration between the World Bank and the Oﬃce
of the Prime Minister of Uganda, with funding provided by the Japanese government and the
World Bank. As part of this study, a survey of NGOs was undertaken in 2002 in collaboration
between the Centre for the Study of African Economies of Oxford University and International
Development Consultants, a Ugandan research consultancy ￿rm.
The starting point for the survey is the Uganda NGO registry. Since 1989, the NGO Reg-
istration Statute of Uganda requires all NGOs to register with the NGO Registration Board in
the Ministry of Internal Aﬀairs (MIA). The registry does not include the Catholic Church, the
Church of Uganda (Anglican), and the Uganda Muslim Supreme Council, three organizations
that have been operating in the country for many years. On initial registration with the Board,
NGOs receive a 1 year registration certi￿cate which is renewable for a period of 3 years assuming
4There is, of course, the ominous example of the Movement for the Restoration of the Ten Commandments of
God, a registered Ugandan NGO, which is thought to have killed more than 700 of its followers in the late 1990￿s.
Other, less dramatic accounts speak of crooks and swindlers attracted to the sector by the prospect of securing
grant money.
5As part of the consultation with the Ugandan NGO task force, Dombo (2000) wrote an issues paper regarding
institutional and technical capacities and constraints aﬀecting the ability of Ugandan NGOs to deliver services in
health, education and water/sanitation.
9that the NGO ful￿ls the renewal requirements.
As of December 2000, some 3,499 NGOs were registered with the NGO Registration Board
(MIA). Our initial estimate was that only 15-30% of the NGOs on the register were actually in
operation. Before selecting a random sample of NGOs for the survey, it was therefore decided
that the existing register should ￿rst be updated and veri￿ed. Of the 1777 NGOs listed on the
register as having their headquarters in Kampala, 451 could be traced. This tallies with our
estimate that roughly 15-30% of NGOs registered are in operation.
The survey covers 15 districts of Uganda ￿ Kampala and 14 districts selected among the 56
existing districts. These districts are Arua, Busia, Iganga, Jinja, Kabale, Kassese, Kibaale, Lira,
Luwero, Mbale, Mbarara, Mukono, Rakai and Wakiso. The sample is strati￿ed into Kampala and
the rest of the country, with 100 NGOs interviewed in Kampala and 200 spread proportionately
across the 14 rural districts.6 For sampling purposes, an NGO was said to belong to a particular
district if its headquarters were in that district.
Table 1 summarizes information on sample size by district from the Registration Board
(MIA), the veri￿cation exercise, the random sample selected and the actual number of NGOs
surveyed. There are 2 points to make regarding the table. The ￿rst is the small number of NGOs
that were traced during the veri￿cation exercise in Kampala ￿ 25%. In the districts veri￿cation
was higher ￿ 41%. The second point is that the number of NGOs randomly sampled within
each district matches the number of NGOs actually surveyed in that district remarkably well.
Further evidence of the representativeness of the sample can be found in Barr, Fafchamps &
Owens (2003).
6The Kampala sample was drawn randomly from the 451 traced NGOs. The overall sampling proportion
required to yield a sample of 200 for the districts was calculated by dividing the proposed sample size by the
number of NGOs found in the districts during the listing exercise. This sampling proportion was then multiplied
by the number of NGOs found in each district separately, yielding a self weighting sample.
10District No. on Veri￿ed Selected Surveyed
Registration for Final
Board (MIA) Sample
Arua 36 (73) 8 7 6
Busia 35 (42) 10 6 6
Gulu 61 (90) 36
Iganga 64 (126) 36 25 25
Jinja 143 (136) 29 19 19
Kabale 28 (50) 18 9 9
Kassese 72 (105) 67 41 40
Kibaale 13 (22) 11 6 4
Kotido 8 (39) 6 3 3
Lira 69 (107) 14 12 12
Luwero 17 (90) 13 8 7
Mbale 165 (168) 35 22 25
Mbarara 51 (95) 24 14 13
Mukono 54 (164) 49 20 19
Rakai 12 (49) 14 8 8
Districts 828 (1382) 343 200 196
Kampala 1777 451 100 99
Total 2605 (3159) 867 300 295
Note: Figures in brackets refer to the number of NGOs
operating in those districts according to the NGO register
Table 1: Number of NGO headquarters by sampled districts, including Kampala
114M a i n ￿ndings
This section presents the main ￿ndings from the survey. We begin with a description of the
activities undertaken by sampled NGOs. Next we examine their revenues and expenditure. We
then examine their human and physical resources. We follow with a presentation of our ￿ndings
regarding NGO access to ￿nance. Governance is discussed next. Relationships with government
and other NGOs are discussed last.
4.1 Activities
A proper description of the NGO sector in Uganda begins with detailing what NGOs do. In
the NGO survey, more detailed information was collected on the various activities in which
Ugandan NGOs involve themselves. Most surveyed NGOs in Uganda seem to adopt a holistic
approach. What they do appears to be driven by the speci￿c needs of their target group
and by the resources available to the NGO. Put diﬀerently, NGOs basic approach is to talk
to host communities, identify their most pressing needs, and seek to address them.7 Very few
surveyed NGOs de￿ne themselves around a speci￿c public service, such as a clinic or a vocational
training school. Most resist ￿ or even resent ￿ being described as providers of a speci￿c service.
They prefer to describe their activities in general terms such as ￿community development￿ or
￿promotion of women￿. While this approach guarantees maximum ￿exibility, it also precludes
gains from specialization.
Table 2 presents a summary of what surveyed NGOs do. The two main activities are raising
awareness and advocacy. Nearly all Ugandan NGOs are involved in raising awareness in one way
7Pratt & Sahley (2003) come to a similar ￿nding with their survey of 141 NGOs in 5 developing countries
(Bangladesh, Ethiopia, India, Peru and South Africa). In examining NGO responses to urban poverty they ￿nd
that surveyed NGOs focus much of their eﬀort on training and awareness raising. According to the authors, this
emphasis re￿ects an underlying philosophical focus of the NGOs on individual empowerment and human resource
development.
12or another. In terms of topic, HIV/AIDS is the most often cited, with two thirds of Ugandan
NGOs actively involved in raising awareness about the subject. Other health issues are the next
most often cited topic. Nutrition and gender issues are covered by half of surveyed NGOs. Other
often cited issues include human rights and protection of the environment.8
Raising awareness is achieved primarily via meetings and workshops. A handful of very large
NGOs in the sample reached over 100,000 people in a year. But for most NGOs the number of
people reached by these meetings is quite small. The median ￿gure is 400 people, meaning that
o v e rap e r i o do fo n ey e a r ,m o r et h a nh a l fo fs u r v e y e dN G O sr e a c hf e w e rt h a n4 0 0p e o p l ei nt h e i r
public awareness activities. Advocacy is the next most important NGO activity, with around
60% of surveyed NGOs involved one way or another. The primary mode of advocacy is meeting
with local and national authorities. Over the sample, the average number of such meetings in
ay e a ri s1 8w h i l et h em e d i a ni s6￿y e ta n o t h e rr e ￿ection of the wide size disparities among
NGOs. One third of those NGOs involved in advocacy prepare public statements to the radio
or the press. After raising awareness and advocacy, education and training are the next most
important activities. In most cases, the educational activities of NGOs are of a short duration,
i.e. workshops and meetings, and are part of their public awareness campaigns. A few NGOs
provide vocational training.
Around one third of sampled NGOs are involved in supporting farmers. Another third is
involved in credit (often micro-credit) or ￿nance more generally. For the average NGO, however,
the number of credit recipients remains small: the median is 150. The sample is dominated by
three NGOs responsible for three quarters of all loans granted. Counselling services are cited
by 17% of respondents. Some form of curative health service is oﬀered by 16% of respondents.
8In their study of six developed and ￿ve developing countries, Salamon & Anheier (1996) ￿nd that the range
of NGO activities is vast. Looking at the aggregate picture they report that 24 percent of expenditure is on
educational activities; 24 percent on health; 20 percent on social services; 16% on culture and recreation; 9
percent on business; 5 percent on housing development; and the remaining amount divided between international
work, civic advocacy and the environment.
13Activities %
Raising awareness 96.6%
Advocacy and lobbying 59.1%
Education and training 57.4%
Credit and ￿nance 32.8%
Support to farming 32.3%
HIV/AIDS awareness and prevention 20.6%
Counselling 16.8%
Curative health services 15.8%
Providing grants to NGOs/CBOs 15.2%
Support to small businesses 11.3%
Community development 11.0%
Helping the poor and needy 11.0%
Water and sanitation 10.7%
Research and evaluation 10.3%
Library and documentation 10.0%
Wildlife preservation 8.9%
Home visits and outreach 8.6%
Employment facilitation and promotion 8.2%
Preventive health services 7.9%
Arts and culture 7.6%
Support to children 7.2%
Distribution of goods and materials 6.9%
Support to orphans 6.5%
Construction of facilities 6.5%
Providing technical assistance 6.5%
Catering and food preparation 5.8%
Con￿ict resolution and crime prevention 5.8%
Professional association 4.8%
Shelter and relief 4.1%
Forestry 2.7%
IGAS 1.4%
Table 2: Activities as decribed by respondents
14Some 15% of surveyed NGOs provide grants to other NGOs or to community-based organizations
(CBOs). Other, more targeted interventions are oﬀered by a small number of NGOs.
In terms of geographical coverage, close to half of the surveyed NGOs operate in one district
only. Three quarters of surveyed NGOs operate in 4 districts or less. Only 7 surveyed NGOs
operate nationwide. Some 85% of surveyed NGOs declare having a speci￿c target group of
bene￿ciaries while 45% focus on the poor. Women and children are the dominant target group.
Orphans are cited as a target group by one NGO out of ￿ve, a concern likely to be related to
the large number of AIDS orphans in the country. HIV aﬀected individuals are also a special
focus of many NGOs. Very few surveyed NGOs focus on victims of war or violence.
As is clear from the above, the activities of surveyed NGOs resemble traditional charitable
work performed by established churches such as the Church of Uganda, the Catholic Church,
and the Uganda Muslim Supreme Council. The reader may therefore be curious as to whether
surveyed NGOs are nothing but churches in disguise. This does not appear to be the case, at
least for the majority of the sample. Only 30% of surveyed NGOs are faith-based. Of those, one
quarter is aﬃliated with the Church of Uganda and one quarter with the Pentecostal Church.
Eight NGOs in the sample identify themselves as Muslim. Of those faith-based NGOs, three
quarters organize religious worship and proselytize via workshops, open air speeches, and door-
to-door visits. It is interesting to note that these methods are very similar to those used by
non-confessional NGOs to spread their awareness-raising message. Ugandan NGOs thus borrow
much of their approach and mode of operation from churches. This is hardly surprising given
the historical importance of churches in the development of the NGO sector in Uganda.
A striking feature of the results is the importance given by NGOs to ￿talking￿ as opposed to
physical delivery of goods or services. Many words are used to describe this activity (educating
the poor, raising awareness, capacity building, community development, advising, counselling,
15etc). The belief that educating the poor and needy helps improve their livelihood is probably
grounded in the implicit belief that ignorance is a major cause of poverty and unhappiness. It
is conceivable that many NGOs would like to do more than ￿talking￿ but, given their limited
￿nancial means, ￿nd it the quickest and cheapest way to have an immediate impact that deals
with the urgency of the situation. Since the actuality and eﬀectiveness of light interventions
such as half-day workshops and home visits are diﬃcult to monitor relative to, say, a clinic, the
emphasis on ￿talking￿ probably makes it easy for ineﬀective or unscrupulous organizations to
hide among the sector.
4.2 Revenues and expenditures
We now turn to ￿nances. 93% of surveyed NGOs hold accounts and many respondents gracefully
showed us detailed accounts of their costs and revenues. It should be pointed out, however, that
a large number of surveyed NGOs experienced serious diﬃculties putting the required ￿gures
together for the enumerators. This is true even though most NGOs claim that they prepare
accounts and distribute them to members on an annual basis. Only two thirds of surveyed
NGOs (199 observations) could provide ￿gures for revenues and expenditures. Of these, some
62 NGOs declared revenues that roughly matched expenditures. For the other 137 observations,
revenues and expenditures do not add up or diﬀer dramatically from each other.
Our impression is that many NGOs, especially small ones, only keep approximate accounts.
This could re￿ect a lack of expertise or lack of interest in accurate accounts. Alternatively,
it could result from a desire to dissimulate a for-pro￿t motive. At this point, we cannot tell
which explanation is most likely. The reader should keep in mind that the ￿gures presented this
section, which are only based on the 199 observations for which we have somewhat more reliable
data, are subject to large measurement error. Total revenues and expenditures need not sum to
16the individual amounts in the respective columns because of adding-up errors in the data.
We begin with the revenue side, summarized on Table 3 in thousands of Uganda Shillings. We
observe a strong 14% increase in total revenues between 2000 and 2001. If we factor in in￿ation,
the increase is less impressive, however. More detailed analysis is required to ascertain the true
growth of the sector as a whole. The Table shows an average total revenue of 478 million Shillings
(roughly equivalent to 275,000 US$). This ￿gure, however, is misleading because reported ￿gures
are heavily in￿uenced by a small number of large NGOs: three large NGOs receive half of the
total revenue in the sample. Thirty NGOs account for 90% of the total revenue of sampled
NGOs.
Since surveyed NGOs diﬀer so dramatically in size, when analyzing the various sources of
funds, it is useful to compare the average of individual revenue shares with the share of the
average revenue. The ￿rst number, reported in the third column of Table 3, gives an idea of
how the average NGO in our sample funds its activities. The second number, reported in the
fourth column, gives a breakdown of total funding by source and is heavily in￿uenced by what
large NGOs do. Because divestments do not represent long-term, sustainable sources of funds,
both columns focus on recurrent revenue only.
We see that the funding sources of the average NGO diﬀer considerably from those of the
NGO sector as a group. This indicates that large and small NGOs have very diﬀerent sources of
funding. In terms of the sector as a whole (fourth column), grants received from international
NGOs are the largest source of funding, accounting for nearly half of total funding in 2001.
Grants from bilateral donors is the next largest category with grants from local government
the third largest source of grant funding to the sector. Small NGOs, however, are less likely to
receive funding from these three sources and more likely to depend on non-grant income. Their
grant income is also more dependent on Ugandan NGOs and the National government.
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year year average weighted
2001 2000 share average share
A. Grants from: 48.6% 80.1%
International NGO 204181 163725 29.1% 43.1%
Ugandan NGO 4418 4777 4.3% 0.9%
National government 2709 1547 1.8% 0.6%
Local government 24611 163 2.1% 5.2%
UN Organization 9212 28845 1.5% 1.9%
Bilateral donor 134152 113094 9.9% 28.3%
B. Members and fund-raising 27.4% 2.5%
Membership fees 2096 1269 12.4% 0.4%
Voluntary donations from members 1718 819 9.0% 0.4%
Voluntary donations from non-members 7778 3787 5.3% 1.6%
Pro￿t on special events 62 114 0.7% 0.0%
C. Business income 16.1% 7.1%
Income from business 23143 20000 4.0% 4.9%
Fees by bene￿ciaries 7217 5125 6.9% 1.5%
Income from services rendered to government 902 948 0.8% 0.2%
Income from services rendered to other NGO 1414 820 2.3% 0.3%
Property/endowment income 855 638 2.0% 0.2%
D. Other 7.9% 10.4%
Tax refunds 31 39 0.0% 0.0%
Other income 49025 5344 7.8% 10.4%
E. Divestment
Sale of land and buildings 17622 27
Sale of vehicles 1886 2120
Sale of equipment and machinery 1537 1399
Total revenues 477905 418231
All ￿gures reported in thousands of Ugandan Shillings and based on 199 observations
with complete data
Table 3: Revenues
18The sector as a whole derives very little revenue from local fund-raising from members and
non-members, with only 2.5% of all funding coming from these sources. For small NGOs, the
percentage is much higher, so that across the sample the average share of funding coming from
these sources is over one quarter. Fund-raising money comes primarily from members. Donations
received from non-members and pro￿t from fund-raising events account for a very small share
of NGO funding. Business income, fees paid by bene￿ciaries, and other income are also more
important sources of revenue for small NGOs than for large ones, as re￿ected in large average
shares (column 3 of Table 3). One third of surveyed NGOs own a business, the pro￿to fw h i c hi s
used to ￿nance charitable activities. Again we observe a high concentration, with a small number
of NGOs accounting for most of these businesses. The types of business run by Ugandan NGOs
are extremely varied, with nevertheless a concentration in farming, canteens, and retail trade.
For their sample of NGOs, Salamon & Anheier (1996) ￿nd that funding comes from three
main sources: private charitable giving which accounts for only 10 percent of funds; government
support and public sector payments including grants and contracts which account for 43 percent
of funding; and most importantly private fees and payments, often from the sale of services
or products, which account for 47 percent of funding. According to the authors, reliance on
private fees moves the organizations away from their charitable roots and puts them in direct
competition with private businesses. Compared with Salamon & Anheier (1996), we ￿nd less
reliance on private fees and revenues in aggregate.
The picture of NGO funding that emerges from these ￿gures is one in which most funding
comes from outside sources (international NGOs and bilateral donors) and is allocated to a small
number of Ugandan NGOs.9 This situation is not dissimilar to what happens with bank ￿nance:
9This ￿nding con￿rms Hulme and Edwards￿ (1997) observation that an increasing amount of oﬃcial aid is spent
through NGOs in developing countries. They argue the reasons for this increase in source of funding are twofold,
namely that NGOs are seen as vehicles for democratisation, and a cost-eﬀective way of helping those not reached
by the market. However, they level concern that NGOs are becoming too close to northern government donors
19in Africa, large ￿rms receive the lion share of total bank funding to ￿nance their investment, while
small ￿rms depend primarily on retained earnings (e.g. Bigsten, Collier, Dercon, Fafchamps,
Gauthier, Gunning, Oduro, Oostendorp, Patillo, Soderbom, Teal & Zeufack 2003, Fafchamps &
Oostendorp 2002). It is conceivable that many sampled NGOs have been correctly identi￿ed by
donors as under-performing and denied funding for this reason. Another more likely explanation,
suggested in the conceptual section, is that foreign donors ￿nd it diﬃcult to identify the best
performing NGOs. To economize on search and screening costs, they may choose to concentrate
their activities on a small number of NGOs they have learned to trust. It is also possible that
donors minimize screening and monitoring costs by granting large amounts of money to a small
number of organizations. We revisit these issues in subsequent sections.
T u r n i n gt oN G Oe x p e n d i t u r e s ,w e￿rst note that reported expenditures are 10% below
reported revenues. If true, this diﬀerence would mean that Ugandan NGOs are not strictly
speaking non-pro￿t organizations, in the sense of the conceptual section. Because the account-
ing information provided by respondents is often inconsistent, however, one should refrain from
drawing such a stark conclusion. The median ratio between revenues and expenditures is prob-
ably a safer ￿gure to consider. Its value is 1.03, meaning that at the median revenues are 3%
higher than reported expenditures, a diﬀerence that is not signi￿cant given the discrepancies
present in the data.
Regarding the composition of expenditures, we observe a surprising similarity between
columns 3 and 4, indicating a broad convergence between small and large NGOs as far as the
composition of expenditures is concerned. Expenditures are divided into three broadly equiv-
alent categories: program costs, wages and allowances, and other costs. The latter category is
thereby losing important elements of their potential contribution through loss of their independence. Whilst most
funding does come from outside sources in Uganda, the fact that it is allocated to such a small number of NGOs
suggests concern over loss of independence of the sector as a whole is not yet founded.
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year year average weighted
2001 2000 share average share
A. Program costs and payments to bene￿ciaries 30.5% 34.5%
Program costs 135199 115829 28.8% 33.6%
Per diems to bene￿ciaries 3569 3697 1.7% 0.9%
B. Manpower costs 28.7% 25.3%
Wages and salaries 94016 95609 19.4% 23.4%
Housing allowances 607 477 2.0% 0.2%
Transport allowances 3768 3633 3.8% 0.9%
Per diems to staﬀ 3623 2155 3.5% 0.9%
C. Payments and transfers to others 5.2% 2.2%
Payment to others for services rendered 1065 903 1.4% 0.3%
Payment to NGOs for services rendered 5437 7847 2.6% 1.4%
Grants and contributions given to other NGOs 2416 1664 1.2% 0.6%
D. Other costs 25.1% 32.5%
Utilities 2395 1770 2.9% 0.6%
Petrol/fuel 7477 6940 3.9% 1.9%
Rent 4220 2788 6.9% 1.0%
Interest charges 429 194 0.3% 0.1%
Bribes 11 9 0.1% 0.0%
Miscellaneous costs 116160 101390 11.0% 28.9%
E. Investment 10.5% 5.5%
Land and buildings 9327 12850 4.3% 2.3%
Vehicles 7582 4987 2.0% 1.9%
Equipment and machinery 5014 6237 4.0% 1.2%
Bank balances 132 17 0.2% 0.0%
Total expenditures 432065 385418 100.0% 100.0%
All ￿gures reported in thousands of Ugandan Shillings and based on 199 observations
with complete data
Table 4: Expenditures
21a mixed bag dominated by miscellaneous costs. Close scrutiny suggests that the miscellaneous
cost category simply represent costs that respondents were unable to break into the detailed
categories listed in Table 4. Some NGOs, for instance, report ￿seminar costs￿ but are unable
to break them up into per diems to bene￿ciaries, per diem for staﬀ, and the like. Other costs
also include supplies such as stationary and utilities such as telephone. The large share of total
costs represented by wages and allowances is consistent with earlier observations that the sector
focuses more on ￿talking￿ than on the delivery of physical goods and services.
Per diem rates paid by surveyed NGOs vary dramatically across the sample. The information
provided by respondents is often inconsistent or missing. Based on the available information,
the distribution of per diem rates appears bimodal, with one mode around 2 US$ and another
around 30 US$. The lower of these two rates probably corresponds to the per diem rate paid
to bene￿ciaries who attend NGO workshops while the higher number is likely to represent per
diem payments to staﬀ g o i n gt ot h e￿eld. Per diems to staﬀ and bene￿ciaries reportedly account
for only a small portion of total expenditures ￿ less than 2% for the sampled NGOs as a whole,
albeit slightly more for small NGOs (Table 4).
Payments and transfers to others represent a small share of total expenditures. Small NGOs
appear more likely to pay for services rendered. They also spend more on rent ￿ probably
because they are less likely to have buildings of their own. Grants and payments to other NGOs
appear minimal. This contradicts the common perception that Ugandan NGOs relay part of
the funding they receive from International NGOs to smaller NGOs and CBOs: together, grants
and contributions to other NGOs and payments to other NGOs for services rendered represent
less than 1% of the total expenditures of the sample. If the reported numbers are to be believed,
bribes paid by NGOs are virtually non-existent.
224.3 Resources
We now turn to the various resources sample NGOs have at their disposal. We begin with
manpower, continue with land and equipment, and conclude this sub-section with our ￿ndings
regarding NGO leadership.
Data on NGO manpower is particularly scarce in the literature. Salamon & Anheier (1996)
report that in the developed countries they surveyed, 1 in every 20 workers is employed in the
nonpro￿t sector. Within the services sector, 1 in 8 is employed by NGOs. These ￿gures ignore
the number of volunteers. While the authors concede that it is much more diﬃcult to obtain
comparable information for developing countries, they conclude that employment in the NGO
sector is more extensive than commonly thought.
This also appears to be the case in Uganda. Surveyed NGOs muster considerable manpower
resources. The average total number of staﬀ m e m b e r sa n dv o l u n t e e r si s1 2 9 .T h i s￿gure masks
large disparities among NGOs, however. Three sampled NGO alone account for three quarters
of the manpower resources of the sample as a whole, indicating considerable concentration in
the sector. The median of 18 staﬀ members and volunteers is much smaller than the average
but is still non-negligible compared to, say, the private sector where the economic landscape is
dominated by micro-enterprises with one or two workers.
Table 5 reports the average number of staﬀ and volunteers in various categories. We see
that full-time and part-time volunteers account for most of the manpower available to surveyed
NGOs. Religious staﬀ is another important category, but it is entirely dominated by a single
observation. Surveyed NGOs have some 15 full-time salaried staﬀ members and another 18
part-time employees. The division of manpower resources by occupation shows a relatively large
number of managers and professional staﬀ and volunteers. Professionals and managers are more
likely to be remunerated than staﬀ in ￿other￿ occupations. Clerical staﬀ is most likely to be
23Salaried Volunteer Religious Unspe- Total of which :
FT PT FT PT staﬀ ci￿ed foreign secondment
Management 2.6 0.4 2.4 2.0 0.7 0.0 8.2 0.3 0.1
Professional 5.0 1.3 2.6 2.7 0.3 0.0 12.1 0.3 0.1
Clerical 2.2 8.9 0.3 7.2 0.1 0.0 18.8 0.0 0.0
Other 3.6 7.0 12.2 31.6 0.1 0.0 54.7 0.1 0.0
Unspeci￿ed 1.4 0.0 0.1 0.0 32.7 34.2 0.4 0.0
Total 14.9 17.7 17.7 43.6 34.0 0.1 129.4 1.0 0.2
Table 5: Manpower resources
Full time Part time
Medical doctors 0.4 0.5
Nurses 1.9 27.9
Social scientists 3.1 0.9
Other university degree 1.8 0.7
Quali￿ed teachers 3.4 1.5
Lawyers 0.3 0.1
Total 10.8 31.8
Table 6: Highly quali￿ed personnel
part-time salaried. Volunteers are most likely to fall into the ￿other￿ category. We ￿nd very
few foreigners working in Ugandan NGOs and very few people on secondment from other, e.g.,
international NGOs. The Uganda NGO sector may depend on foreign funding; it does not
depend on foreign manpower.
Table 6 breaks down highly quali￿ed personnel into professional categories. The numbers
reported are averages over all surveyed NGOs. Teachers and social scientists represent the
largest categories of full-time quali￿ed personnel, re￿ecting the emphasis Ugandan NGOs place
on social issues and on communication with bene￿ciaries. Nurses constitute the largest category
of part-time quali￿ed personnel, but this is due to a single observation. 65% of surveyed NGOs
do not employ nurses, either part-time or full-time.
The NGO sector is expanding rapidly in terms of manpower ￿ or at least the surveyed NGOs
are. Table 7 shows the number of people who have left and joined surveyed NGOs over the
12 months preceding the survey. It also shows the number of funded vacant positions at the
24Number Number Currently
who left who joined vacant posts
Management 0.58 0.98 0.26
Professional 0.63 2.20 0.20
Clerical 0.83 9.60 0.08
Other 0.46 8.51 0.04
Table 7: Job turnover during the last 12 months
time of the survey. In all categories the number of those who joined exceeds the number of
those who left. The gap is particularly large for clerical and other categories. NGOs appear to
experience some diﬃculties ￿nding the needed managerial and professional staﬀ,a se v i d e n c e d
b yt h en u m b e ro fu n ￿lled vacant positions.
Ugandan NGOs need land and buildings to perform their task. Survey results show that 45%
own real estate and 54% rent land and buildings. In addition, 37% have complimentary access
to land and buildings belonging to others. Combining the various sources, we ￿nd that 94% of
the surveyed NGOs have a building or piece of land they can use for their activity. The values
involved are not negligible. The median property value of those NGOs who own real estate is
5.4 million shillings. A small proportion of NGOs also rent out land and buildings.
We also have information on the type of buildings NGOs use. Not surprisingly, the most
frequent building type is an oﬃce, with 90% of the surveyed NGOs having at least one oﬃce. One
quarter of surveyed NGOs have buildings for staﬀ accommodation. We also ￿nd a high average
number of places of worship, but this ￿gure is dominated by a single respondent: more than 85%
of surveyed NGOs do not have a place of worship. NGO buildings are relatively well equipped:
most of them have electricity, piped water, and a telephone connection. The type of buildings
NGOs have is revealing about the kind of activity they are engaged in ￿ particularly whether
they oﬀer physical services. We ￿nd that one quarter of NGOs have at least one building they
use as a school. Only 19 NGOs (6%) in the sample have a hospital but 15% have a clinic. 13%
have one or more shelters. This suggests that a non-negligible proportion of sampled NGOs are
25equipped for some form of service delivery. However, more than 60% of surveyed NGOs have
none of these specialized buildings ￿ and thus cannot oﬀer health care, shelter, or long-term
schooling and vocational training. This is consistent with our earlier ￿nding that the median
Ugandan NGO is more focused on ￿talking￿ than on providing physical services.
In terms of vehicles, NGOs are less well equipped. Half of surveyed NGOs do not have
any motorized four-wheel vehicle. 37% do not own any form of transport equipment, including
bicycles and motorcycles. One quarter of surveyed NGOs, however, use vehicles belonging to
other people or organizations. If we include these and two-wheelers, we still have 35% of NGOs
without transportation. The situation is slightly better regarding equipment. Two thirds of
surveyed NGOs own equipment such as computers, medical equipment, or farm implements.
One quarter uses equipment belonging to other people or organizations. If we count owned and
borrowed equipment, 82% of NGOs have some equipment. Three quarters of surveyed NGOs do
not hold inventories, a ￿nding consistent with the lack of emphasis on the delivery of physical
goods and services.
We now turn to leadership. A good leader is arguably one of the most precious resources
an NGO can have. Quality of leadership is thus to be considered as one of the resources of an
NGO, at par with equipment and ￿nance. In three quarters of surveyed NGOs, the director is
a man. The director has an average age of 40, is nearly always a Uganda national, and speaks
an average of three local languages. Two thirds of directors come from the middle class: only
30% consider their parents as being poor. Most directors are married with a spouse who is a
housewife, a civil servant or running her own trade or business. In only 12% of surveyed NGOs,
is the director￿s spouse a staﬀ member of the NGO. In most cases the director is a lay person
but 15% of surveyed NGOs are run by someone with a religious aﬃliation (e.g., priest, pastor,
mullah).
26NGO directors are very well educated by any standard, with on average 14 years of education
￿ i.e., secondary level plus two; 84% of directors have a tertiary or university degree. They are
also experienced, half of them having worked for another NGO before joining and another
half having worked for government prior to becoming director. Directors are generally well
connected abroad, with 41% of them having a relative living outside Uganda. Half of them
travelled outside Uganda prior to joining the NGO that currently employs them. They are also
well connected locally, and state knowing on average 18 civil servants in local government before
joining the NGO. The median, however, is smaller: 3. One third of directors are involved in
another NGO as well and one half has an occupation other than director of the NGO ￿ usually
as a professional or involved in farming, trade, or business. Such features are common among
entrepreneurial individuals. They imply that the entrepreneurial quality of NGO directors is
quite high. Multiple occupations nevertheless dilute directors￿ eﬀort while possibly generating
externalities in terms of access to information and experience. Another aspect to this form of
leadership is that the operations of the NGO may be governed by the expertise or interests
of the leader rather than by communities￿ needs. For instance, a survey of 14 NGOs and 28
poverty reducing projects in Ethiopia ￿nd that the technical production components of projects
are haphazardly selected according to agency and/or individuals￿ partial experience rather than
relating them systematically to global experience (Belshaw & Coyle 2001). For Uganda, these
issues are examined in some detail by Barr & Fafchamps (2003).
4.4 Finance
We have seen that grant income is the life and blood of Ugandan NGOs since it represents 86%
of the total revenues of surveyed NGOs. Not all NGOs, however, have access to grant money. In
our sample, 30% of surveyed NGOs had never received any grant. Of those, only 47% applied for
27one in the year preceding the survey, compared to 24% for those who have ever received grant
funding. Among those NGOs that did not apply for a grant, the most common reason cited
for not applying is that the grant application process is too complicated and time consuming.
Others are too new to have applied, or lack the necessary information.
Of those who applied for a grant in the 12 months preceding the survey, one third did not
secure grant funding. In most cases, no reason was given for rejection. The median waiting time
to hear about an unsuccessful grant application is 1 month or less. One third of unsuccessful
applicants feel that the grant allocation process is not fair and objective. For those NGOs whose
grant application was successful, the origin of grant funding mirrors the ￿gures reported for grant
revenues: most grants come from International NGOs (43%) and bilateral donors (16%). Grants
from the mother NGO account for 10%. One out of six recipients thought the application process
was not fair and objective.
The majority of Ugandan NGOs hear about available grants directly from grant agencies
themselves: 27% of grant recipients heard about the grant from someone in the granting agencies
while another 20% received a call for proposal from the grant agency. Some 30% of grant
recipients heard about the grant from another NGO or someone else. A similar breakdown
is observed for unsuccessful applicants, suggesting that access to information about available
grants is not the main constraint to grant funding. Around 30% of grant recipients submit a
grant application either in partnership with ￿ or with a letter of support from ￿ a line ministry.
Close to 40% submit either in partnership or with a letter of support from local government.
Similar proportions are observed among unsuccessful grant applicants, so that we can probably
rule out lack of support from government as a reason for rejection.
The grant process is in general very bureaucratic. A small number of grant recipients (20%)
obtain a grant without ￿ling a formal application, mostly from their mother NGO or from an
28international NGO, but they are the exception. Other applicants have to provide a lot of sup-
porting documentation ￿ typically a description of planned activities, a budget, a timetable, and
evidence of bene￿ciary assessment. Others also submit CVs and quotes for materials. The least
often cited type of supporting documentation is the NGO￿s balance sheet and income statement
and its cash ￿ow projections. This lack of emphasis on NGO accounts by grant agencies may
explain why surveyed NGOs often appear to have incomplete accounts. It nevertheless raises
the possibility of double counting ￿ i.e., that the NGO counts the same activity or expenditure
for two diﬀerent grants at the same time. Less than half of grants are renewable, so that the
application process must be repeated each time. The median time elapsed to hear about a
successful application is 4 months (average is 6 months).
Reporting requirements to grant agencies are very variable. Some 16% of grant recipients
declare having no reporting requirements at all, but most satisfy at least two types of reporting
requirements while a small number of NGOs must satisfy up to 8 diﬀerent reporting require-
ments. The most common type of requirement is the ￿nal report, cited by half of grant recipients.
Final accounts are cited by one third of recipients. Progress reports and interim accounts of
varying periodicity are mentioned by most recipients. In addition to reporting requirements,
NGOs are also subject to close monitoring. Nearly 80% of surveyed NGOs receive the visit of
agents from the grant agency. Some NGOs are visited every week, but the average number of
visits is 5 per year. In addition, some 61% of grant recipients declare conducting an assessment
with their target group or host community, with an average frequency of 5 per year.
For one quarter of grant recipients, monitoring from government is also present when grant
funds are channelled through local government. Such procedure, however, is subject to diﬃcul-
ties. One sixth of recipients whose grants are channelled through local government complain of
diﬃculties getting the government to disburse the funds. A small minority ￿ 4% ￿ also say they
29have to pay bribes to get the funds released, for a value ranging from 2% to 15% of the funds.
Grants are not the only way to ￿nance NGO activities. Funding agencies may also choose
to sub-contract speci￿c tasks to Ugandan NGOs. In practice, the diﬀerence between a grant
and a contract is not large, although we suspect monitoring is more intensive in a contract as
the funding agency is probably more closely involved in the de￿nition and implementation of
the activities. In contrast to grants, nothing precludes philanthropic organizations from sub-
contracting speci￿c tasks to for-pro￿t organizations.
A little under one quarter of surveyed NGOs have ever been paid to provide a service on
behalf of an organization which, 40% of the time, is another NGO and 25% of the time is the
government. The application process to setting up a contract is not very diﬀerent from a grant
application and the reporting requirements are equally extensive yet variable. Monitoring by
the sub-contracting agency is less likely (58% of the cases) but more intense in terms of number
of visits. Other features are similar to grants. These ￿ndings further bring out the similarity
between sub-contracting and grant funding and the general observation that the Uganda NGO
sector serves as relay for international governmental and non-governmental donors.
NGOs are no stranger to banks: the overwhelming majority of surveyed NGOs have a bank
account and half of them have a savings account. This is important because monitoring move-
ments of funds on their customers￿ accounts is one of the means by which banks assess their
customers for credit purposes. Yet, NGOs have very limited access to credit. Only 12% of
surveyed NGOs, however, have an overdraft facility. Some 15% of the sample has ever bor-
rowed money. Of those, however, less than half borrowed from a bank or ￿nancial institution;
others borrowed from other NGOs or from the government. To some extent, ￿ndings are under-
standable: NGO revenues are primarily made of grant income, and grant income is notoriously
unpredictable. For the many Ugandan NGOs involved in micro-credit, however, insuﬃcient
30access to credit would seriously limit their operations. As anticipated, we ￿nd a signi￿cant rela-
tionship between borrowing and micro-credit activities: those NGOs who borrow are more likely
to be involved in micro-credit. What remains unclear, however, is whether it is those NGOs
able to borrow who venture into micro-credit or whether banks lend to those NGOs who involve
themselves in micro-credit. Finally, only a handful of surveyed NGOs resorted to hire-purchase
(leasing), mostly for vehicles or equipment.
4.5 Governance
We now examine the governance structure of surveyed NGOs. We begin by discussing registra-
tion and monitoring by government. We have seen that grant agencies monitor recipients closely.
NGOs are also monitored by government. To begin with, we note that 86% of the NGOs in our
sample declare being registered with the Registration Board of the Ministry of Internal Aﬀairs.
Of those registered, most have been registered for a long time. The median year of registration
is 1997. Respondents were also asked when they last renewed their registration. The median
year is 2000. Some 60% of surveyed NGOs are registered with the Registrar of Companies,
Ministry of Justice. This grants them legal personality and enables them to own land in their
own name. Year-to-year monitoring by government authorities is mostly done by line Ministries
and local government representatives. Since their creation, 70% of surveyed NGOs have been
visited by a representative of local government; 43% were visited by someone from a line Min-
istry. In contrast, only 17% of surveyed NGOs have been visited by a representative of the NGO
Registration Board (MIA).10 Half of the respondent NGOs declare showing their annual report
to local government representatives and one third shows their annual accounts. The closeness of
10This picture is corroborated by a case study of Oxfam health programmes in 8 Ugandan districts (Cannon
2000). The study reports that, at the national level, the NGO-government relationship is diﬃcult and that co-
ordinating and monitoring NGOs is seen as a major problem, with no-ministry having a proper data-base of
NGOs. According to Cannon (2000), NGO leaders and government medical personnel are more familiar with
each other￿s activities at the district level.
31this relationship is not surprising given that most NGOs in our sample operate at the local level
￿ mostly in one or two provinces only. NGOs are thus subject to some scrutiny from government
authorities.
Ugandan NGOs are very keen to involve host communities in the actual delivery of services
or the execution of projects, with 90% of respondents doing so. This involvement, however,
rarely implies a payment from the NGO. Surveyed NGOs ￿nd out the needs of the communities
they serve primarily via participatory workshops with community members: this method is cited
by three quarters of the sampled NGOs. Surveys run by the NGO are cited in two thirds of the
cases as well. Other favoured methods include direct observation by NGO staﬀ and discussions
with opinion leaders in the community. Similar techniques are used to evaluate how well the
NGO ful￿ls the needs of the community it assists.11 One ￿fth of NGOs base their evaluation in
part on surveys run by organizations other than themselves.
Whether these methods identify the target population correctly is diﬃcult to say. In a study
evaluating the impact of 4 British funded NGOs in rural poverty alleviation in Bangladesh,
South India, Uganda and Zimbabwe, Riddel et al. (1995) ￿nd that many projects failed to
reach the poorest. In Uganda they ￿nd that the NGOs surveyed rarely undertake the detailed
social analyses necessary to identify the target group. In Zimbabwe the projects do not reach
the poorest farmers: those with capital and education bene￿t the most (Muir & Riddel 1992).
Finally, in Bangladesh they ￿nd that the NGO clients are not from amongst the very poorest,
and there is a tendency for the greatest bene￿ts to go to those who are already better oﬀ. Barr
& Fafchamps (2003), in contrast, uncover some evidence that NGOs seek to target poorer albeit
less isolated communities.
Turning to oversight, our survey results show that it is also done by members. Some 80% of
11This is in accordance with the literature on evaluating NGO success which calls for participatory community
and self-assessment (e.g. Riddell 1990, Fowler 1995, Fowler 1995, Powell 1987) .
32surveyed NGOs have some kind of membership system. Members are predominantly individuals
although in 42% of NGOs with a membership system, members are other organizations such as
NGOs and CBOs. The number of members can be quite large, with half the surveyed NGOs
having 100 members or more. The average number of members is heavily in￿uenced by a small
number of NGOs with a very large number of members: two NGOs account for close to 80%
of all NGO members in the sample. Membership appears to be on the rise, but this ￿nding is
heavily in￿uenced by two of the largest NGOs in the sample, so it may not be representative of
the sector as a whole. Nearly all NGOs with a membership system hold meetings. The average
NGO held its last meeting 6 months or so before the survey. The average number of members
present at the last meeting was 300, with a maximum of 20,000. The median is much lower: for
half the surveyed NGOs, the number of members present was less than 50.
While 14% of surveyed NGOs restrict their services to members only, the overwhelming ma-
jority cater to both members and non-members. Less than 5% cater to non-members only. This
suggests that, in the context of Uganda, members are nearly always intended bene￿ciaries. This
is in contrast with many philanthropic organizations in developed countries for which ￿members￿
are primarily expected to contribute and ￿membership￿ is but a way of generating revenues.
Nearly all surveyed NGOs accept new members; they are open organizations. Procedures to
become a new member diﬀer markedly, however. The most common steps are the payment of a
membership fee and ￿lling in a form. In 10% of surveyed NGOs, membership supposes religious
conversion. Membership fees are very low and in general commensurate with the wealth level of
the population. This is consistent with the observation that members are primarily bene￿cia-
ries. In some NGOs, members are expected to make small donations of money or to volunteer
their time. There is considerable variation in what is considered appropriate. Some NGOs are
satis￿ed with as little as 6 hours a year; others expect members to be full-time volunteers.
33Nearly all surveyed NGOs have a committee that oversees its activities. Some 60% of sur-
veyed NGOs have a Board of Trustees and 77% have a Board of Directors. Only 10% have
neither. The average numbers of trustees and directors are both 7. Taken together, the existence
of a membership system combined with the presence of an oversight committee should ensure
a lot of internal oversight. Furthermore, the fact that members are nearly always bene￿ciaries
and that membership is fairly open aligns the incentives of the NGO with that of recipients of
NGO services. It nevertheless remains unclear how eﬀective this system is in preventing abuse
and wastage. Also it is unclear to whom abuse can be reported if it is uncovered.
Surveyed NGOs provide some reporting to their members and oversight committee. Some
88% of surveyed NGOs state they prepare an annual report. In one quarter of these cases,
however, the last annual report by the respondent NGO was prepared more than 12 months
before the survey, suggesting that a sizeable proportion of NGOs slack on their reporting duties.
The annual report is destined primarily for members and, in a large number of cases, for the
funding agency. Half of the surveyed NGOs declare giving a copy of their annual report to the
NGO Registration Board (MIA). Some also show their report to line Ministries. 85% of surveyed
NGOs declare making their annual report available to the public upon demand. This, however,
may be wishful thinking: most surveyed NGOs were unable (or unwilling) to make a copy of
their report available to survey enumerators.
Around 80% of sampled NGOs state that they prepare a balance sheet and income statement
each year. As for the annual report, however, one ￿fth of respondents prepared their last accounts
more than a year before the survey. Two-thirds of respondents who prepare accounts claim these
accounts are externally audited. We ￿nd this hard to believe given the relatively poor quality of
account information provided to enumerators. Accounts are also primarily shown to members
and trustees, with one third of respondents claiming they give a copy of their accounts to
34the NGO Registration Board (MIA) ￿ presumably to satisfy re-registration requirements. 73%
of respondents claim accounts are available to the public upon demand but a much smaller
proportion were able to provide enumerators with consistent sets of accounts.
4.6 Relationship with other NGOs and with the government
A recurrent theme in the literature is that the lack of NGO coordination results in unnecessary
replication of activities and in serving the same bene￿ciaries (e.g. Acharya, Aryal, Karmacharya
& Meyer 1999, Belshaw & Coyle 2001). This does not appear to be the case in Uganda. Ugan-
dan NGOs are heavily networked into each other. Some 72% of surveyed NGOs belong to a
local NGO network or umbrella organization. The main service derived from these networks
appears to be the organization of meetings and conferences (cited by 87% of respondents), the
constitution of an information data base (55% of respondents), and access to communication
services (17% of respondents). Other services such as building or vehicles are hardly ever cited.
Some 38% of Ugandan NGOs are also members of international or regional networks. There
appears to be a very large number of such networks, with over 100 diﬀerent networks cited
by survey respondents alone. In fact, no two surveyed NGOs were members of the same in-
ternational network. The services provided by international networks mirror those of national
networks: meeting and conferences (87%); information data base (61%); and communication
services (28%). International networks appear to be a little stronger on physical services, with
16% of aﬃliated NGOs getting access to oﬃce space or vehicles. For most NGOs, networks
provide useful services but they do not provide equipment and oﬃce space.
We have already seen that the government often plays a role as partner or facilitator in grant
applications. Before concluding, we discuss our other ￿ndings regarding the relationship between
NGOs and the government. We ￿rst note that taxes are not a topic that surveyed NGOs feel
35too con￿dent about. As we have explained in the conceptual section, in developed countries
having a non-pro￿t status for tax purposes is one of the bene￿ts of being legally regarded as a
charity. In Uganda, NGOs are surprised by the very idea that their activities could be subject
to taxation. As far as we can judge, surveyed NGOs do not appear to ￿le corporate taxes. They
therefore enjoy a de facto non-pro￿t status without having to demonstrate to the tax collecting
agency that they do not distribute pro￿ts to members or management. What is clear is that
NGOs do not pay corporate taxes on the grant income they receive. It is unclear whether, as
employers, NGOs pay income taxes on the salaries they pay to their staﬀ. After pre-testing,
questions on income and corporate taxes were dropped from the questionnaire as they created
too much anxiety. Questions about other forms of taxation were maintained, however. About
25% of the respondents state they are exempt from paying taxes on their supplies and 14%
state they are exempt of import tariﬀs on vehicles and equipment. Since only 7 respondents
list ￿tax refunds￿ as source of revenue, however, it is unclear whether the question was properly
understood. A handful of respondents stated that a line ministry refunded them for an import
tax on equipment.
Next we turn to partnerships with line Ministries. Some 70% of surveyed NGOs are in
partnership with at least one Ministry. The most often cited partner Ministry is the Ministry of
Gender, Labour and Social Aﬀairs. The next most often cited is the Ministry of Health. Most
partnerships are informal but a little over one third of surveyed NGOs have a memorandum of
understanding with at least one Ministry. Partnership agreements with a Ministry enables NGOs
to approach funding agencies with support from authorities, thereby facilitating the screening
process.
Surveyed NGOs were also asked whether the government staﬀ with whom they interact
is a help or a hindrance. Results indicate a certain ambivalence towards government, with
36close to 60% of respondents stating that government staﬀ help them in their task, but 27-29%
stating that government is both a help and a hindrance. 93% of surveyed NGO think that local
government staﬀ faces their own constraints that make it diﬃcult for them to help NGOs. The
most often cited constraint is lack of funding. Over half of respondents also cite constraints
dictated by national government. One third of respondents even feel that local government
staﬀ feels resentment towards NGOs. The most often cited reason for this state of aﬀairs is
dissatisfaction with pay relative to pay in the NGO sector, and lack of resources to do their
job well. NGOs appear to be perceived by some local governments as competitors who divert
resources away from government and are better paid for doing the same job.
5C o n c l u s i o n
Performance and accountability are key terms found in the literature. The future of the NGO
sector has been closely linked to its ability to convince the public that it is performing and ac-
countable. Examples can be found in the ￿elds of sociology (Edwards & Hulme 1995), economics
(Salamon & Anheier 1996) and law (Brody 2002).
This study is the ￿rst to attempt to review the whole NGO sector in a country. Only through
such national surveys can we begin to identify key performance indicators and accounting prac-
tises that can help us to evaluate the sector. Using original survey data collected in Uganda,
we have documented the activities, resources, and governance structure of non-governmental
organizations operating in the country. The picture that emerges from this analysis is diverse.
The Uganda NGO sector combines elements of political activism and philanthropic work. It
attracts many educated Ugandans who wish to help poorer members of society while earning
a living for themselves. Contrary to our initial expectations, faith does not seem to be their
primary motivation: only a third of the surveyed NGOs are faith-based. Most NGOs do, how-
37ever, operate in ways that are broadly similar to religious charities. As hypothesized by Scott
& Hopkins (1999), at the heart of many NGOs is a small group of educated Ugandans willing
to volunteer some of their time, or to work for lower pay, for the chance of helping the poor.
Many surveyed organizations implicitly blame poverty in part on ignorance and lack of
organization. This is re￿ected in the emphasis they put on eﬀorts to ￿educate￿, ￿sensitize￿, ￿train￿,
and otherwise inform the poor about all kinds of relevant issues ￿ from AIDS and hygiene to
nutrition and domestic violence. As a result, ￿talking￿ to intended bene￿ciaries is the dominant
activity of surveyed NGOs and nearly all Ugandan NGOs are involved in raising awareness in
one way or another.12 Political mobilization is also important, as re￿ected by the emphasis on
advocacy and capacity building. Many NGOs seek to organize local communities to deal with
their own problems and to be heard by local and national government. Few Ugandan NGOs,
however, go beyond these two basic activities, and when they do they typically see their other
activities as part of a larger concern. Virtually no NGO sees itself simply as provider of a
speci￿c service. All have a holistic approach, which gives them more ￿exibility to respond to
the perceived needs of the population they serve, but presumably limits gains from experience
and specialization.
Regarding funding, there is extreme variation in the level of ￿nance NGOs receive. The
average NGO generates quite a bit of funds from members and individual donations. But at the
aggregate level, the amounts collected are very small (2.5% of aggregate funding in our sample).
In the aggregate, most NGO funding comes from international NGOs. In this sense, the Uganda
NGO sector appears to be an oﬀshoot of international development assistance, and the mode
of operation of Ugandan NGOs largely re￿ects the agenda and concerns of international NGOs.
12Furthermore, for many surveyed NGOs, going to villages and poor neighbourhoods is seen as an activity in
itself. This suggests that perhaps these NGOs need to acquaint themselves with the condition of the population
they seek to help.
38There is apparently very little solicitation from the general public in Uganda by local NGOs.
There are enormous disparities within the NGO sector. A handful of large NGOs attract most
of the funding while the majority has little or no funding at all. The diﬃculty of securing grants
￿ and the short-term nature of grants ￿ probably explains why most NGOs remain unspecialized.
Many NGOs are registered in the hope of securing a grant but fail in that endeavour. Others get
a small seed grant but fail to secure larger grants, possibly because they are unable to convince
granting agencies that they can deliver. Well funded NGOs focus more on service delivery but
what is unclear is whether they do so because they receive more funding, or receive more funding
because they focus on service delivery. This issue deserves further research.
Regarding governance, we ￿nd that most of the screening, monitoring, and evaluation is done
individually by grant agencies. Reporting requirements appear fairly onerous, especially given
the limited administrative capacity of most surveyed non-governmental organizations. Some
monitoring is also done internally, either by members directly or by trustees. Government over-
sight is present but fairly limited. Although a stated objective of the sector, transparency is in
practice problematic for many NGOs: although most respondents claim to circulate their annual
accounts and reports to the public upon request, few were able to provide this information to
enumerators. Furthermore, less than 60% of respondents were able or willing to provide data
on their revenues and expenditure. For those that did provide accounts, ￿gures on revenues and
expenditures seldom agree. These ￿ndings should not be construed as evidence that misappro-
priation of funds is common place, but they suggest that the administrative capacity of many
surveyed NGOs leaves much to be desired. In such an environment, we fear that it would not
be diﬃcult for unscrupulous individuals to successfully pose as bona ￿de NGO representatives.
The analysis presented here seems to indicate that the Uganda NGO sector is quite en-
trepreneurial in the sense that it is led by individuals skilled in attracting international aid
39(Stiles 2002). There is nothing wrong with this state of aﬀairs provided Ugandan NGOs deliver
the service expected of them (e.g. Azam & Laﬀont 2003, Platteau & Gaspart 2003b). To ￿nd
out whether they do, it is necessary to approach bene￿ciaries directly. Evidence to this eﬀect
is provided by Barr & Fafchamps (2003) who show that Ugandan NGOs are generally well per-
ceived in the country, especially when they make the eﬀort to communicate with the bene￿ciary
population.
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